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WHICH WEIGHT MATTERS IN
DRUG OFFENSE CASES?
I.

INTRODUCTION

"A person who sells LSD on blotter paper is not a worse
criminal than one who sells the same number of doses on
gelatin cubes, but he is subject to a heavierpunishment."
United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1333 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner J., dissenting).
When federal drug offenders are found guilty of drug offenses,
their sentence depends on the amount of drug involved in the crime, which
can be calculated in two potential ways.1 First, the entire amount of the involved substance, even if it contains just a trace of narcotic, can be weighed
to determine the sentence.2 Alternatively, the sentence can be determined
by weighing the amount of useable drug involved in the offense, pursuant
to the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual.3 The calculation method varies from circuit to circuit, producing incongruities in
drug offense sentences for similar offenses from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.4
The question of whether or not to include all substances containing
traces of narcotic or to simply weigh the useable amount has been a
longstanding question in the war against drugs.5 In response to the rise in
drug abuse in the United States, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug

1 See Controlled

Substances Penalties Amendment Act of 1984, chp. Comprehensive Crime

Control Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006); see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453,
460 (1991); United States v. Stewart, 361 F.3d 373, 382 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that only useable mixtures can be used in determining drug quantity for sentencing purposes). But see United
States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623, 625-26 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that weight of indigestible materials should be considered in drug weight for sentencing).
2 See Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 625-26 (holding total weight of suitcase constructed partially of cocaine was appropriately included in drug weight).
3 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 1 (2013) [hereinafter
"USSG"], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2013 Guidelines/Manual PDF/index.
cfm; United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1196-1197 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that amount of
useable drug should be used in determining sentences).
4 See Jane L. Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and the
FederalSentencing Guidelines,94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1471, 1505 (2000).
5 See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 460 (1991).
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Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.6 Subsequently, Congress made
amendments to this Act, setting the stage for Chapman v. United States in
1991.8 In Chapman, the Supreme Court stated "[s]o long as it contains a
detectable amount, the entire mixture or substance is to be weighed when
calculating the sentence." 9 The decision in Chapman has caused a split
among the circuits regarding how to interpret the holding. 10 Subsequently,
the Supreme Court affirmed the Chapman holding in Neal v. United
States." However, many courts are still reluctant to impose sentences
based on the weight of an entire mixture, causing sentences to vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 12 The Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits employ the "market-oriented" approach, which holds that
6 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 801
(1970).
7 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
8 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (1984) (containing two
particularly relevant provisions relating punishment to quantity and attempting to end sentencing
disparity); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1986) (introducing idea of sentencing
drug offenders based on amount of distributed drug).
9 500 U.S. at 459.

10 See United States v. Stewart, 361 F.3d 377, 377 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[O]nly useable or consumable mixtures or substances are included in the drug quantity for sentencing purposes.");
United States v. Berroa-Medrano, 303 F.3d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 2002) (including entire weight of
heroin that was heavily diluted with common cutting agents); United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d
428, 432 (2d Cir. 1999) (including weight of moisture in consumable crack cocaine); United
States v. Tucker, 20 F.3d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1994) (including weight of moisture in fully processed, consumable crack cocaine); United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (7th Cir.
1993) (finding waste water containing unusable cocaine base is excluded from weight of mixture); United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding total weight of mixture
method is contrary to congressional intent and purposes underlying guidelines); United States v.
Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1007 (3d Cir. 1992) (excluding weight of unusable boric acid from
packages containing boric acid and layer of cocaine); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129,
136 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining punishing defendant for mixture weight which exceeds potential
meth weight is unwarranted by statute); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1238
(11 th Cir. 1991) (holding that term mixture as used in USSG does not include unusable mixtures).
But see United States v.Clarke, 564 F.3d 949, 956 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding liquid which was not

yet meth but not waste water should be included); United States v. Treft, 447 F.3d 421, 425 (5th
Cir. 2006) (holding Chapman's marketability test does not apply to cases involving meth); United
States v. Kuenstler, 325 F.3d 1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (counting unfinished methamphetamine
solution as mixture because it would eventually be turned into useable product); United States v.
Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1158 (10th Cir. 1996) (basing sentence on solution which had not been
processed into meth instead of useable material); United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d
623, 625-26 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding cocaine, together with acrylic forming part of a suitcase was
a "mixture").
11 516 U.S. 284, 296 (1996) (holding statute directs sentencing courts to take weight of blotter paper into account).
12 See Richard Belfiore; Annotation, Under What Circumstances Should Total Weight of
Mixture or Substance in which Detectable Amount of Controlled Substance is Incorporatedbe
Used in Assessing Sentence Under United States Sentencing Guideline § 2d.1 - Post-Chapman
Cases, 113 A.L.R. FED. 91 (2012).
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"only useable or consumable mixtures or substances are included in the
drug quantity for sentencing purposes."13 Alternatively, the so-called
plain-language approach, employed by the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuit, compels sentencing courts to include in the drug weight, which, for
statutory purposes, is any part of a solid or liquid containing a detectable
amount of drug. 14 In Part I, this note will discuss how Congress's intent in
drafting 21 U.S.C. §841(b) sheds light upon the intended meaning of "mixture and substance" in the statute, clarifying any ambiguities. 15 Furthermore, subsequent amendments reinforce this ideal. In Part II, this note will
demonstrate that using the market-oriented approach is the proper way to
16
resolve the circuit splits because it carries out the intent of Congress.
Lastly, Part III will demonstrate the perils of employing the plain-language
approach over the market-oriented approach, due to the alarming disparity
in sentences for similar crimes that contradicts Congress's intent to provide
uniformity.1 7 This note will investigate the fairness of these sentences to
determine if the plain-language approach, in fact, may lead to absurd results. 18 Such analysis will show that the marked-oriented approach will
provide a more consistent result and decrease disparate sentencing for federal drug offenses, thus carrying out the intent of Congress.

13 See United States v. Stewart, 361 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. BerroaMedrano, 303 F.3d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that entire weight of heroin should be considered when heavily diluted by cutting agents); United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 432 (2d
Cir. 1999); United States v. Tucker, 20 F.3d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that weight of
moisture in consumable crack is included in mixture); United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192,
1196 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that weight used to calculate offense level should not include
byproduct of cocaine production ); United States v. Rodriquez, 975 F.2d 999, 1006 (3d Cir.
1992); United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that weight of liqueur
used to conceal drug should not be included in mixture); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129,
135 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231,1238 (11th Cir. 1991) (excluding weight of liquid carrier medium in which cocaine was dissolved because it was unuseable).
14 See Clarke, 564 F.3d at 956 (finding liquid which was not wastewater but not meth should
be included in sentencing weight); Treft, 447 F.3d at 425 (finding mixture which had not been
made into meth should be included); Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 625-26); (holding weight of
indigestible materials should be included in drug weight).
15 See infra Part II; see also, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)-(a)(1) (2012) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally[] to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ... .
16 See infra Part III; see also USSG § lAl Intro (A) (2013).
17 See cases cited supra note 10 and accompanying text (listing cases from each side of circuit split).
18 See United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing RolandeGabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991) (including weight of useable mixtures leads to
"widely divergent sentences" for severity.")).
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HISTORY

The history of 21 U.S.C. § 841 extends back to 1970, when Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
("CDAPCA") in an effort to quell the rising problems with substance abuse
in the United States.1 9 The CDAPCA divided drugs based on their potential for abuse and linked penalties to whether or not the drug involved in
the offense was narcotic or non-narcotic. 20 In 1984, Congress passed the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act, "a sweeping set of reforms that sought
to address the problem of crime in our society, 2 1 to amend the CDAPCA
in order to combat the sentencing disparities resulting from the CDAPCA
and its failure to account for quantity when determining punishment. 22
A chapter of this amendment, called the Controlled Penalties
Amendments Act, provided for the first time that punishment is dependent
upon the quantity of the drug involved.23 Two years later, in 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, in an effort to more effectively and
fairly punish drug traffickers who were supplying drugs to the street market, by basing punishment on the quantity of drug distributed rather than
the amount of pure drug involved. 24
The rationale behind this method was that Congress did not
want to punish drug traffickers any less because even
though they were dealing in smaller quantities of pure
drug, they were the source of the drugs supplying the mar-

19

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)-(a)(1) (2012) ("[I]t
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or

intentionally[] to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ....); Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236 (1970) (classifying drugs according to potential for abuse); see also Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 460 (1991) (explaining that law based punishment on whether drug was
narcotic, not amount of drug possessed).
20 See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 460 (explaining punishment was not linked to quantity of drug
involved in offense).
21 See Jane L. Froyd, supra note 4, at 1472 (addressing Congress's response to issue of increased drug offenses in our communities).
22 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1984) (making punishments dependent on amount of drug involved in offense); see also Chapman, 500 U.S. at 460-61
(explaining shift from basing penalties on whether drug is narcotic to weight of drug).
23 See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 460 ("The Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of
1984 . .. first made punishment dependent upon the quantity of the controlled substance involved.").
24 See USSG Appendix. C. (2013); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, H.R. REP. No. 99-845, pt.
1,at 12, 17 (1986), available at 1986 WL 295596; see also Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461 (suggesting Congress intended to punish drug traffickers similarly because they were perpetuating street
market).
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ket, and without them, the drug trade could not exist. 25
With regard to traffickers, the total quantity seemed more important than quality when the goal was to quell the drug market.26
The 1986 Act represented a concerted effort by Congress to deal
harshly with the nation's drug problem through strict, mandatory sentences
for drug offenders.It based the new mandatory minimum penalties on the
principle that the quantity of drug involvement in an offense reflects both
the harm to society as well as the offender's culpability. 27
Congress initiated these reforms, such as the Sentencing Reform
Act, in order to strengthen its arsenal in the "war against drugs., 28 Upon
study of the legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress's
intention becomes clear: to create a fair sentencing system which would
eliminate sentencing disparities. 29 In fact, Congress expressed three specific objectives for the Sentencing Reform Act.30 First, Congress wanted the
time served to match the sentence, instead of offenders being released after
serving just a few months.3 1 Next, and most relevant to this note, Congress
aimed to reduce the disparity in sentencing offenders who were convicted
of similar crimes and had similar criminal histories.3 2 Finally, Congress
wanted to establish a scheme that produced more proportional results in
sentencing offenders, by ensuring that the sentence given matched the severity of the crime.33 In order to achieve these three 3objectives,
Congress
4
established the United States Sentencing Commission.

25
26
27

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461.
See id. at 561.
See Froyd, supra note 4, at 1486-87 (internal quotation omitted) (describing that laws were

passed to combat increasing drug- related offenses).
28 See Belfiore, supra note 12.
29 See Froyd, supra note 4, at 1471.
30 See id. at 1475-76.
31 See Froyd, supra note 4, at 1475-76; see also, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 56 (1983), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235; USSG § 1A1 Intro (A)(1) (2013) ("[The] practice [of indeterminate sentencing] resulted in a substantial reduction in the effective length of the sentence
imposed, with defendants often serving only about one-third of the sentence imposed by the
court.").
32 See Froyd, supra note 4 at 1478; see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235; USSG § 1A1 Intro (A)(3) (2013).
33 See Froyd, supra note 4, at 1478 . "The Senate Committee Report states that 'the use of
sentencing guidelines and policy statements is intended to assure that each sentence is fair compared to all other sentences."' ld. At 1476, n. 47 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225 at 51 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3234; see also USSG, ch. 1, pt. A3 (2013) ("Second, Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences
imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.")).
34 Froyd, supra note 4, at 1476-77.
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Additionally, when drafting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), Congress aimed to
enable law enforcement to focus on disabling "major traffickers, the manufacturers or the heads of organizations, who are responsible for creating
and delivering very large quantities of drugs."3 5 Although its major target
was the drug kingpins, Congress did not intend to lessen the punishment for
retail drug traffickers; although street dealers deal in lesser quantities of
drug, they "keep the street markets going., 3 6 Congress did not want to let
street dealers off the hook; however, it also was not Congress's intention to
ratchet up the offense level based on a mixture that is not ingestible and
therefore, not marketable.3 The main concern of Congress was regulating
"mixtures that will eventually reach the streets, i.e., consumable mixtures."3
The focus should not be on how the offender transports the
drug-for example, in how many bottles of crdme liqueur he uses to
transport it, as described in United States v. Acosta-but the weight of the
amount of drug transported in those bottles.3 9
Section 2D1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines states
that "unless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled substance set
forth in the table refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance
containing a detectible amount of the controlled substance.,, 4 0 The accompanying Application Note 1 to United States Sentencing Commission
Guidelines Manual section 2D1.1 states that the phrase "mixture or substance" as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in 21 U.S.C. §
841, except as expressly provided. 41 The definition does "not include materials that must be separated from the controlled substance before the controlled substance can be used" and gives examples such as "fiberglass in a
cocaine/fiberglass bonded suitcase, beeswax in a cocaine/beeswax statue,
and waste water" resulting from the manufacturing of a controlled substance. 42 "Ifsuch material cannot readily be separated from the mixture or
substance that appropriately is counted in the Drug Quantity Table, the
court may use any reasonable method to approximate the weight of the

" H.R. REP. No. 99-845, at sec. 314 (1986), available at 1986 WL 295596 (describing
background of bill).
36 See United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Chapman, 500
U.S. at 460 (citing H.R. REP No. 99-845, pt. 1, ppp. 12 (1986), available at 1986 WL 295596
(explaining Congress intended penalties for amounts of drugs ready for retail))).
37 See Johnson, 999 F.2d at 1196 (citing United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.
1992)).
38 See United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 554. (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting USSG § 2D1.1(a)
(2004)).
39 See id.at 963 F.2d at 556.
40 See USSG 2D1§ 2D.1(a), n.1 (2013).
41 See USSG § 2D1.1, n.1 (2013).
42 See id.(expounding upon unclear definition of "mixture or substance").

2014]

WHAT WEIGHT MATTERS?

mixture or substance to be counted. ' 43 In 1993, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines, including the Application Notes to section
2D1.1, by adding the above-quoted passages, as well as another clarification that excluded the weight of an lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD")
container from the sentencing calculation.44
During the reign of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Chapman.45 In Chapman, the three plaintiffs were
convicted of selling one thousand doses of LSD in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841.46 The weight of the LSD alone was 0.05 grams, but when the blotting
papers were included, the weight increased to 5.57 grams, causing the
plaintiffs to be sentenced to the five-year mandatory minimum for possession of greater than one gram.4 The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's ruling that § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) required the weight of the carrier medium be included in the weight for sentencing.4 8 In his dissent, Stevens
posits that the consequences of the majority's interpretation of the statute
are so bizarre, that it cannot be what Congress intended.49
In Chapman, the Court did admit that situations may arise where a
sentence would be disproportionate or even arbitrary.50 While the Court
held that Chapman used the typical carrier medium for LSD, they could
imagine a case where using the plain-language approach could result in a
disparate sentence due to the weight of the carrier medium being much
greater than the drug.5 1
In 1993, in response to the conflict that arose among the circuits
post-Chapman, the United States Sentencing Commission approved
Amendment 484 to the Sentencing Guidelines.5 2 This amendment clarified
43 See id.
44 See USSG Appendix C, amends. 484, 488 (2013) (amending Guidelines to clarify differing interpretations of "mixture or substance" by courts).
4' 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
46 See id. at 467-68; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2010) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or ... a mixture or substance ...
."1).

47 See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 455-56.
48 See id. at 459 ("So long as it contains a detectable amount, the entire mixture or substance
is to be weighed when calculating the sentence.").
49 See id. at 468. (arguing that such results will contradict Congress's intent for uniformity in
sentencing). Id. at 474; S. REP. No. 98-225, at 45-46 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3228-29 ("A primary goal of sentencing reform is the elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparity.")
50 Chapman, 500 U.S. at 466.
51 See id. at 466.
52 See USSG Appendix C., amend. 488 (2013) (controlling mandatory minimum sentence
under § 841(b)).
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the definition of "mixture" and "substance" providing that "mixture or substance does not include materials that must be separated53from the controlled
substance before the controlled substance can be used.,
III.

FACTS

As a result of the decision in Chapman, the circuits have been split
on their interpretations. A number of the circuits have taken the "marketoriented" approach, holding that only the useable portion of the drug
should be weighed for sentencing purposes 54 However, other circuits have
held the plain-language approach applies and the gross weight should be
taken into account for sentencing, including unusable material as well as
carrier materials, such as blotting papers." The First, Fifth, and Tenth Cir-

13 See USSG § 2D1.1, note 1 (2013); United States v. Sprague 135 F.3d 1301, 1305
(9th Cir.
1998) (holding unusable materials that must be removed before drug use must be excluded from
sentence); USSG § 2D1.1, comment (n.1) (2013) ("The weight of a packaging material to which a
controlled substance is bonded, such as 'fiberglass in a cocaine/fiberglass bonded suitcase' or
'beeswax in a cocaine/beeswax statue[,' is excluded]."); see also United States v. Stewart, 361
F.3d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[W]eighing everything for sentencing purposes can lead to irrational results contrary to congressional intent.").
54 See United States v. Stewart, 361 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[O]nly usable or
consumable mixtures or substances are included in the drug quantity for sentencing purposes .... );
United States v. Berroa-Medrano, 303 F.3d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 2002) (including entire weight of
heroin that was heavily diluted with common cutting agents); United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d
428, 432 (2d Cir. 1999) (including weight of moisture in fully processed, consumable crack);
United States v. Sprague, 135 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that if able to be separated, nonuseable material should be excluded for calculating sentence); United States v. Carter, 110 F.3d
759, 761 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding weight of pot was too wet to use for sentencing purposes);
United States v. Tucker, 20 F.3d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1994) (including weight of moisture in fully
processed, consumable crack); United States v. Jackson, 115 F.3d 843, 848 (11th Cir. 1993)
(holding sugar and cocaine package should not have been included in weight); United States v.
Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1197 (7th Cir. 1993) (excluding weight of unusable waste water in solution with just traces of cocaine base); United States v. Newsome, 998 F.2d 1571, 1575-79 (1 1th
Cir. 1993) (finding "gross weight of 'unusable mixtures' should not be equated with the weight of
a controlled substance for sentencing purposes"); United States v. Palacios-Molina, 7 F.3d 49, 5354 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding weight of liquid not to be used in sentencing because cocaine not
marketable until distilled); United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1992) (excluding
weight of creme liqueur from solution containing creme liqueur used to conceal drug); United
States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to include weight of cornmeal
mixed into cocaine because cornmeal portion is not "usable"); United States v. Rodriquez, 975
F.2d 999, 1008 (3d Cir. 1992) (excluding weight of unusable boric acid from packages containing
boric acid and layer of cocaine); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129, 135-36 (6th Cir. 1991)
(declining to include entire contents of crockpot containing methamphetamine and other chemicals for sentencing purposes); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir.
1991).
55 See United States v. Clarke, 564 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he entire weight of the
biphase liquid justly is attributed to [defendant] .... ); United States v. Treft, 447 F.3d 421, 425
(5th Cir. 2006) ("The law in this Circuit is clear: the Chapman marketability test does not apply
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cuits hold if a detectable amount of narcotic is contained in a material, even
if such material is not ingestible, then it should be included in the total
weight for sentencing. 56 Even though this method is easy to apply in practice, it has great potential to lead to absurd results. 5 In United States v.
Salgado-Molina, the court held that including liquid waste for purposes of
determining sentence length was no more logical than including the weight
of the Atlantic Ocean when calculating the sentence of a hypothetical defendant who floated cocaine across the water. 58 By following the plainlanguage approach, courts have chosen to include in the weight for sentencing twice the total weight of suitcases (minus the metal parts); the weight of
a beeswax statue; twenty-four gallons of liquid containing detectable traces
of methamphetamine, even though the liquid was considered to be waste;
and over forty pounds of liquid waste in a crockpot containing only eleven
pounds of finished meth powder.59 In United States v. Mahecha-Onofre,
the suitcase, minus the metal parts, weighed 9.5 kilograms, while the cocaine alone weighed just 2.5 kilograms and Mahecha-Onofre was sen60
tenced for a total of twelve kilograms.
The Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits reject this
notion and hold that if the material in which the narcotic is contained is uningestible, it should not be included in the calculation. 6 ' This method fur-

when determining whether a liquid is a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine under
§ 841."); United States v. Kuenstler, 325 F. 3d 1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding liquid solutions were mixtures containing methamphetamine under plain meaning of term "methamphetamine"); United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1996) (utilizing ordinary
meaning of "mixture"); United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623, 625-26 (1st Cir. 1991)
(finding that cocaine combined with acrylic material to form part of suitcase was "mixture").
56 See supra, cases cited at note 55 (rejecting notion that sentences should be based on
amount of useable drug material).
57 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (sentencing defendants based upon weight of
carrier, not upon drug quantity).
58 United States v. Salgado-Molina, 967 F.2d 27, 29 (2nd Cir. 1992).
59 See United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1126 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing lower
court's inclusion of weight of suitcases in sentence even though drug was easily distinguishable);
United States v. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d 96, 99 (1st Cir. 1991) (affirming lower court's
treatment of cocaine and beeswax as mixture; Mahecha-Onofre,936 F.2d at 625-26 (finding suitcase/cocaine chemically-bonded material was mixture).
60 See Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 625.
61 See United States v. Stewart, 361 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[O]nly useable or consumable mixtures or substances are included in the drug quantity for sentencing purposes"); United States v. Berroa-Medrano, 303 F.3d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 2002) (including entire weight of heroin
that was heavily diluted with common cutting agents); United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428,
432 (2d Cir. 1999) (including weight of moisture in fully processed, consumable crack); United
States v. Sprague, 135 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that if able to be separated, non
useable material should be excluded for calculating sentence); United States v. Jackson, 115 F.3d
843, 848 (1 1th Cir. 1997); United States v. Carter, 110 F.3d 759 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (holding weight
of marijuana was too wet to use for sentencing purposes); United States v. Tucker, 20 F.3d 242,
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thers the goals of Congress ensuring that the offender is punished for the
amount of marketable drug that he has dealt, and not based upon how
heavy a substance he has chosen in which to transport it. 62 "[It is not how
one trafficks in the commodity ...that is important but, rather, how much
of the commodity one transports or distributes that is relevant in calculating
the weight of a controlled substance for sentencing purposes. ,,63
The common drugs, which are affected heavily by this distinction
in weighing methods, are among some of the most prevalent in our culture:
methamphetamine, cocaine, LSD, marijuana, and heroin. The circuits employing the market-oriented approach argue that the rationale of Chapman
was that material that is used to cut the pure controlled substance or serve
64
as a carrier should be included in the weight. However, it was not the intent of Chapman to base sentences on the weight of containers, which is
evident from the court's having reasoned that even though the mixture was
ingestible since the wine cocaine mix was drinkable, it was not intended for
consumption in that form, but was intended only to be transported in that
form, and therefore should not be included in the calculation. 65
IV.

ANALYSIS

The meaning of the phrase "mixture or substance" as used in section 2D1.land § 841(b) is unclear. 66 Neither section 2D1.1, nor § 841(b)

244 (7th Cir. 1994) (including weight of moisture in fully processed, consumable crack); United
States v. Newsome, 998 F.2d 1571, 1575-79 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (applying sentencing guidelines to
show that "gross weight of 'unusable mixtures' should not be equated with the eight of a controlled substance for sentencing purposes"); United States v. Palacios-Molina, 7 F.3d 49, 53-54
(5th Cir. 1993) (weight of liquid in which cocaine mixed not to be used in sentencing because
cocaine not marketable until distilled); United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1993)
(excluding weight of unusable waste water in solution composed of waste water and traces of cocaine base); United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rodriquez, 975 F.2d 999, 1005 (3d Cir. 1992) (excluding weight of unusable and toxic boric acid
from packages containing boric acid and a thin layer of cocaine); United States v. Jennings, 945
F.2d 129, 133 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir.
1991).
62 Acosta, 963 F.2d at 556 (discussing sentence should be based on quantity of drug not
weight of means of transport).
63 Id. at 556 (contending amount of drug trafficked is more relevant to sentencing than container it is carried in).
64 See United States v. Sprague, 135 F.3d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing that it
would be irrational to include unusable material in weight); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
453, 463 (1991) ("[T]hose items are ... clearly not mixed or otherwise combined with the drug.").
65 See Sprague, 135 F.3d at 1304; Johnson, 999 F.2d at 1197 ("To read the statute or Chapman as requiring inclusion of the weight of all mixtures, whether or not they are usable, ingestible, or marketable, leads to absurd and irrational results contrary to congressional intent.").
66 See supra note 42and accompanying text (explaining the ambiguities in the terms "mixture
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expressly define the meaning of "mixture or substance," or how it should
be measured for the purposes of the statute.6 The courts are entrusted with
enforcing laws enacted by Congress, and if there is a question as to the
meaning, they must look to Congress's intent in drafting.68 In this instance,
the ambiguity of the meaning of the phrase "mixture or substance" can be
resolved by analyzing congressional intent.69 Once intent is determined,
the meaning of "mixture or substance" must be given a reading that furthers Congress's goals.70 The courts have a responsibility to enforce Congress's laws and to consider Congress's intent in drafting those laws while
doing so. 1
The market-oriented approach is more in line with the intent of
Congress when drafting 841(b). 2 In order to accomplish its goals, Congress had "adopted a 'market-oriented' approach to punishing drug trafficking." 71 "In the Policy Statement of the Guidelines, the Commission reiterated its Congressional mandate to establish a system that embraced
honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing."' v The court must
apply a market-oriented approach to reduce the disparity in sentencing of
similarly situated offenders who committed similar offenses.
The lack of
uniformity caused by applying different approaches violates Congress's
goals in eliminating disparity in sentencing. 6 Furthermore, using the
plain-language approach will cause punishments to be unpredictable from

or substance").
67 See supra note 42and accompanying text (discussing lack of clear explanation of exact
meaning of phrase "mixture or substance").
68 See Belfiore, supra note 12.
69 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
70 See e.g., United States v. Stewart, 361 F.3d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[W]eighing everything for sentencing purposes can lead to irrational results contrary to congressional intent.");
United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1197 (7th Cir. 1993) ("To read the statute or Chapman
as requiring inclusion of the weight of all mixtures, whether or not they are usable, ingestible, or
marketable, leads to absurd and irrational results contrary to congressional intent."); United States
v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding total weight of mixture method is contrary
to congressional intent).
71 See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1327-292828 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cummings,
J., dissenting) (examining legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 841).
72 See United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1996) (Portfilio, J., dissenting) (opining that plain-language approach will cause results opposite to intent of the drafters
of statute).
73 See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 460.
74 See Todd E. Goyner, Federal Sentencing in a Post-Chapman World: What is a "Mixture
or Substance" Anyhow?, 46 KAN. L. REV. 983, 988 (1998); see also Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100
Stat. 3207 (explaining policy concerns regarding sentencing).
75 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (demonstrating potentially absurd sentencing results absent use of market-oriented approach).
76 See Froyd, supra note 4 at ,1471.
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jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and from offender to offender, because even if
the offense is similar, and there is an identical amount of drug involved, the
carriers may have different weights thus producing differing sentences .
The market-oriented approach will help to carry out another one of Congress's goals: -sentences proportionate to the crime committed.78 The
best way to ensure the punishment fits the crime and to reduce disparities in
sentences is to sentence the offender based on the amount of drugs involved in his offense .
Sentences for drug offenders should increase based on the weight
of the drug ready for retail distribution. 0 In the case of United States v.
Robins, the court held that the weight of cornmeal in which cocaine was
mixed, must not be included in the weight for sentencing purposes.81 Even
though the cornmeal was mixed with the cocaine for distribution purposes,
in order to dilute cocaine to increase the amount available for sale and trick
buyers into purchasing the diluted mixture, the court held that it should not
be included in the offense weight. 8 2 The court found that Congress's legislative intent did not require it to conclude that more than the useable portion of the drug was to be considered when sentencing. 3 In his dissent,
Judge Cummings posited that there was no evidence of Congress's desire
for the carrier weight to be included when determining sentences in LSD
cases. 84 In fact, he stated there is "good reason" to believe that Congress
was not aware that the 8court's
interpretation of the statute would produce
5
such inequitable results.
a. The Subsequent 1993 Amendments
The Sentencing Commission's 1993 Amendments served to clarify
the muddled mess of the varied interpretations of "mixture or substance"

77 See id. at 1476.
78 United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1158 (10th Cir. 1996) (Seymour, C.J., dissenting)

(using plain-language approach will have effects contrary to intent of drafters of statute).
79 See Froyd, supra note 4, at 1476 (discussing objectives of certainty, uniformity, and proportionality Congress sought to achieve through sentencing reform).
80 See Belifore, supra note 12.
81 See United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating sole purpose of
cornmeal was to mask identity of cocaine).
82 See id. at 1390-91 (reasoning that although cornmeal is consumable, it does not increase
amount of useable, saleable drug).
83 See id. at 1390-91.
84 See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1327-28 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cummings, J., dissenting).
85 Id.
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following Chapman.8 6 However, instead of clarifying, the amendments
may have caused additional ambiguities. 8 7 The amendment espoused the
marketable approach of the Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, stating a "mixture or substance does not include materials that must
be separated from the controlled substance before the controlled substance
can be used."8 8
In the Amendments, the Sentencing Commission specifically references situations where narcotics are bonded or affixed to substances from
which they need to be removed for use, and thus not included in the sentencing waste.89 The amendments also addressed waste water., which,
even if containing some narcotic, is excluded. 90 Furthermore, the Sentencing Commission references specific LSD cases in the amendment, which
demonstrates the need to deal differently with that drug than from other
narcotics. 9'
b.

Interpretationof Chapman

Some circuits' interpretations of Chapman contradict Congress's
intended objectives for sentencing reform. 92 In an effort to clarify the
meaning of the phrase "mixture or substance," some courts facing this
problem focus on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in deciding Chapman.93 "Most courts seem to fall into two schools of thought, one of which

86 Id.

87 Joseph Rizzo, Comment, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: What Is the FairInterpretation
of "Mixture or Substance"?, 14 PACE L. REv. 301, 325-26 (1994) (identifying interpretation
problems arising from phrase "mixture or substance").
88 Id.
"Mixture" or "substance" as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in 21
U.S.C. § 841, except as expressly provided. "Mixture" or "substance" does not include
materials that must be separated from the controlled substance before the controlled
substance can be used. Examples of such materials include the fiberglass in a cocaine/fiberglass bonded suitcase, beeswax in a cocaine/beeswax statue, and waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture a controlled substance. If such material cannot readily be separated from the mixture or substance that appropriately is
counted in the Drug Quantity Table, the court may use any reasonable method to approximate the weight of the mixture or substance to be counted.
Id. at 325, n. 191.
89 See USSG Appendix. C., amend. 488 (2013).
90 See USSG Appendix. C., amend. 484 (2013) (clarifying that waste water is not to be included in calculating sentences under amendments).
91 Id.
92 See Froyd, supra note 4 at 1476.
93 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing holding of Chapman and listing cas-
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centers its inquiry on whether the mixture at issue, like the blotter paper, is
usable, ready for ingestion or consumption and another which does not rely
on a usable/unusable distinction., 94 A broad application of Chapman,
promoting the plain-language approach across all situations, undermines
the primary concerns of the Sentencing Guidelines. 95 Such an application
encourages disparities in sentencing by going against all congressional
goals of rationality and uniformity in sentencing. 96 Such a "hypertechnical or mechanical" application of the statute, which uses the entire
weight of the substance for sentencing, defeats the purpose of creating a
system that sentences criminals appropriately and proportionally based upon the severity of their crimes. By using the weight of the amount of useable drug, courts will be able to effectively punish dealers based on the
amount they sell, which will produce uniform results across the board. 9'
Their punishment will be a direct result of the amount of drug that they
sold, and thus produce uniform results. 99
The Supreme Court in Chapman admitted that a situation may arise
where the weight of the carrier immensely outweighs the amount of drug,
and a disproportionate sentence may result.100 The facts of RolandeGabriel embody this situation. 1 Just seventy-two grams of a 241.6-gram
mixture were useable drug substance. 102 The court reasoned that to include
the entire weight was unjust and undermined the noble intent of Congress
to provide fair and proportional sentences to offenders. 0 3 The court distinguished Rolande-Gabrielfrom Chapman based on the reasoning that using
the plain-language meaning of "mixture" in an LSD case involving standard carrier mediums does not produce an irrational result as it would based
on the specific facts in the Rolande-Gabriel case. 10 4 The reasoning in
es on both sides of split).
94 See Belfiore, supra note 12, § 2.
95 See United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1996) (Seymour, J., dissenting) (opining that plain-language approach will cause results opposite to intent of drafters of
statute).
96 See id. at 1196.
97 See United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e
hold that the rule of lenity should be applied to the statute to avoid absurdity and irrationality in
the application of the Sentencing Guidelines."); see also USSG § lAl Intro (A) (1)(2) (2013).
98 See Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1235 (choosing rational and uniform approach to sentencing).
99 See id.
100 See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 460 (1991); Belfiore, supra note 20, supra
note 28 at 585.
101 See Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1232-33, 1237.
102 See id. at 1235.
103 See id. at 1235.
104 See id. at 1236.
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Chapman works specifically because the drug cannot be distinguished from
its carrier medium. 0 5 The reasoning does not transfer to cases involving
other drugs. 0 6 The Court makes a point to say that with respect to LSD,
Congress provided that the sentences should
be based on mixture weight,
10
thus distinguishing LSD from other drugs. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took a
step further with its holding in Bristol, when it moved past the ingestibility
test and ruled not to include the weight of wine, into which cocaine had
been mixed, even though it was capable of being consumed. 0 8 The court
reasoned that the true purposed of the wine, although consumable, was to
transport the cocaine, and thus should not be included.1 09
c.

Disparityin Sentences

Although one benefit of the plain-language approach is that it is
relatively easily applied-just weigh the entire mixture-this does not outweigh the inequitably disparate sentences it produces, and this disparity is
precisely the miscarriage of justice that Congress was trying to prevent by
enacting the Sentencing Guidelines. 11 0 Under the plain-language approach,
the court's inclusion of the weight of unusable mixtures to determine sentences leads to "widely divergent sentences for conduct of relatively equal
severity." 1 By contrast, the market-oriented approach holds that there is
no rational basis for a sentence based on the weight of useless material that
is neither ingestible, nor marketable, and therefore, it should be excluded,
thus leading to a punishment based directly on the amount of drug involved. 112 Because of the high risk of disproportionate sentencing, courts
have frequently been unwilling to determine sentences based on the weight
of the total mixture. "' Judge Posner, in his dissent in Marshall, concluded
that "[t]o base punishment on the weight of the carrier medium makes

105
106

See id. at 1237.
See Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1237 (distinguishing cocaine from LSD with regard to

weighing approaches).
107 See id.; see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 466 (1991); Rizzo, supra note
87 at 316.
108 See United States v. Bristol, 964 F.2d 1088, 1090 (11th Cir. 1992).
109 Id.
110 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (indicating Congress's goal to rectify sentencing
disparities).
III See Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1233.
112 See supra note 10; United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing
United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992)).
113 See supra note 28.
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about as much sense as basing punishment on the weight of the defendant." 114
The plain-language approach leads not simply to a disparity in sentences, but often to absurd results. 1 15 "To read the statute or Chapman as
requiring inclusion of the weight of all mixtures, whether they are useable,
ingestible, or marketable, leads to absurd and irrational results contrary to
congressional intent." 116 According to his dissent in Chapman, Justice Stevens posited that a result of the majority's construction of the statute would
be sentences "so anomalous that they will undermine the very uniformity
that Congress sought to achieve when it authorized the Sentencing Guidelines." 11 7 For example, in Johnson, Judge Laythe court describes a potential scenario of a marijuana farmer who harvests his crop, leaving trace
amounts in the soil.118 In the hypothetical, the farmer plows the field, mixing the marijuana throughout the soil.11 9 It would be absurd for the farmer
to be sentenced on the entire weight of soil in the field instead of just the
harvested crop.1 2 0 Or of a defendant disposing of drugs in the toilet, and
the sentence being based upon the weight of the drug combined with the
toilet bowl water. 12 Furthermore, as Judge Posner noted, the severity of
the sentences in LSD cases, particularly, would be comparable to those in
other drug cases only if the weight of the carrier were disregarded. 122 Including the total weight of the mixture, which consists of just a small
amount of useable drug that had been contained in a larger amount of nondrug material, leads to disproportionate and arbitrary sentences. 123
Federal courts are charged with the responsibility of enforcing the
laws enacted by Congress. In order to effectively do so, these courts must
consider Congress's intent in drafting and enacting federal laws. By ruling
according to the plain-language approach, "[t]he Court ... shows little respect for Congress's handiwork when it construe[d] a statute to undermine

114

United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 13211312, 1333 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J. dissent-

ing).
See Johnson, 999 F.2d at 1192, 1196
See supra note 10; see also Johnson, 999 F.2d at 1197.
117 See also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 468 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118 See Johnson, 999 F.2d at 1196.
119 See id.
120 Id. at 1196-97.
121 See United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1196 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1993).
122 See United States v. Chapman, 500 U.S. 453, 469 (1991) (citing United States v. Mar115
116

shall, 909 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posnor, J., dissenting).
123 See United States v. Salgado-Molina, 967 F.2d 27, 29 (2nd Cir. 1992) ("Including the
liquid in this case as a measure of punishment is no more rational than including the weight of the
Atlantic Ocean in sentencing the hypothetical ocean smuggler.").
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the very goals that Congress sought to achieve." 1 24 By applying Chapman
across the board, the plain-language circuits are disregarding the intent of
Congress and condemning offenders to sentences that are neither fair, nor
proportionate, nor uniform, nor just.
V.

CONCLUSION

Almost always, the drug quantity involved in an offense is weighed
most heavily in determining a defendant's sentence. Therefore, it is imperative that the weight be calculated in the most fair and accurate way possible. Congress recognized this importance when calling for fairness, proportionality, and uniformity in drafting the Sentencing Guidelines. The
market-oriented approach carries out the intent of Congress and provides
the fairest, and most accurate means to measure drug quantities. Furthermore, it provides proportionality and predictability in sentencing, thereby
building the public's confidence in the justice system. By contrast, the
plain-language approach breeds unfair and absurd results causing confusion
and instability in the way sentences are determined. In order to carry out
Congressional intent and further the goals of fairness, the market-oriented
approach is the best path to follow.
Joanna Keenan
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See United States v. Chapman, 500 U.S. 453, 477 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

